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The Japanese Sect Aum Shrinryko launched their terror-
ist attack on the Tokyo Underground on the 20 March
1995. Five terrorists boarded underground trains head-
ing for the Kasumigaseki station carrying at least two
bags each of liquid Sarin (Isopropyl methylphophono-
fluoridate ) wrapped in newspaper. These were punctu-
red with the sharpened tip of an umbrella prior to the
escape of the perpetrators and the liquid inside was
allowed to run out and vaporise.
Sarin is the most volatile nerve agent and acts through
anticholinesterase inhibitor. As acetylcholine is the
transmitter at all neuromuscular junctions and through-
out the central and peripheral nervous system, it has
profound effects.
Sarin attaches to acetylcholinesterase preventing
breakdown of acetylcholine. Muscarinic receptor hyper-
stimulation leads to constriction of all smooth muscles
in the body, particularly manifest in bronchospasm and
bronchorrhoea. Nicotinic simulation leads to voluntary
muscle overactivation with muscle fasciculation and
then muscle weakness. Central effects include coma, sei-
zures and loss of central respiratory drive.
In total the attack led to 12 deaths, 54 severely
injured, 980 people moderately affected and over 5000
people who sought medical assistance. Of note, 10% of
ambulance staff and 110 (23 %) hospital staff were also
affected. The numbers killed and injured reflects the
fact that, even though the nerve agent was released dur-
ing one of the busiest periods of transport activity, rush
hour, the sarin was only 35% pure and only ten 500ml
bags were used. They had the technology to do better –
Tsuchiya (the Aum Chemist) had proved he could man-
ufacture higher quality nerve agent, having produced
3kg of 90% pure Sarin from suitable precursors in only
two months.
The Japanese published several papers on their experi-
ences and common themes run through the lessons
they identified. These included the need for physicians
in command and control centres, the requirement for
readily available personal protective equipment. They
highlighted the difficulty of diagnosis and detection of
the agent released and the problems of accessing appro-
priate antidotes. They also discussed the problems of
decontamination procedures and the difficulties of
crowd control [1].
Many of the lessons drawn by the Japanese remain
valid today, but some have been forgotten, ignored or
overtaken by events. Looking back with the benefit of
hindsight and the passage of time these lessons need to
be reviewed or re-iterated.
These include:
Communications will probably fail and rather than
add layer upon layer of complexity and technology to
overcome this problem, it may be better to accept com-
munications will fail and put simpler strategies in place
to manage this almost inevitable situation. Almost every
major incident report mentions communication difficul-
ties and failures and the solution seems to be more, not
less technology [2]. This should be reviewed.
The early diagnosis of chemical exposure and initial
management of the most serious casualties is best per-
formed by highly trained and experienced clinical per-
sonnel using well understood toxidromes, aided by, but
not substituted for, sensors and detectors. Given the
complexities of this diagnosis, this task should be per-
formed by a pre-hospital physician who can rapidly
assimilate the complex presentation of undifferentiated
disease and deliver a working hypothesis and treatment
regime at the point of exposure.
Crowds will be difficult to control and will not remain
at the scene to process through a bespoke decontamina-
tion facility. Be prepared for casualties to flee the scene
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and self-present at health care facilities. In a chemical
terrorist incident all healthcare facilities should expect
to receive casualties who self-refer and know how to
deal with them. This requires education and practice.
The Emergency Services will not be able to adequately
decontaminate all people involved in the incident in either
a timely or meaningful way. Strategies are needed to
stream casualties so that only those who will benefit from
active decontamination undergo the procedure. In most
mass exposure events, it is likely that the majority of those
present will need either no decontamination or deconta-
mination limited to undressing. More research into decon-
tamination procedures is required to identify which
patients need supervised decontamination, which need
only to undress and which need no decontamination at all.
Central control will not be effective in a single large,
or multiple small incidents. Resources and authority
must be delegated to scene commanders in order to
ensure the “man on the ground” has the necessary
means to manage the appropriate area of authority.
That is not to say that the Centre must not control the
logistic reserve or retain control of casualty flow, but
the delegation of responsibility to the lowest level is well
recognized as essential by military commanders who
recognize the difficulties of micromanaging complex
situations [3].
Antidotes need to be immediately available. Holding
antidotes in strategic national stockpiles will not work
when an antidote is required in minutes. High concen-
tration nerve agent vapour exposure will rapidly lead to
death without immediate treatment, similarly the cya-
nides. Even the slower acting agents require treatment
outside the timelines imposed by holding antidotes cen-
trally in “strategic” stockpiles.
Nineteen years after the Tokyo Subway Sarin attack
(and only a year after the use of nerve agents in Syria)
we still have a great deal to learn about how to manage
these incidents. Whilst this paper offers no answers it
will have succeeded if it reignites the debate about how
to manage these incidents.
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